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BOOK REVIEWS
PnocEss iN UNrr- STATES HISTORY. By James Willard
Hurst.' Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Law School, 1960. Pp.
xvii, 361. $5.00.

LAW AND SocAL

The excellence of Law and Social Process in United States History in
every respect matches the high honor accorded Professor Hurst when
invited to deliver the ninth series of the Thomas M. Cooley Lectures under
the sponsorship of the University of Michigan Law School. This volume,
following upon the heels of his Growth of American Law2 and Law and
the Conditions of Freedom,3 the latter having won the James Barr Ames
prize granted quadrennially by the Harvard Law School, merely affirms his
stature as an eminent legal historian. Like the earlier volumes this work
is as captivating in insightful analysis as it is compelling in stylistic quality.
It discloses a mind disciplined by exacting research and informed by
intensive study in the related disciplines of economics, political science,
philosophy, and socio-intellectual history.
Professor Hurst writes in a grand style. He views law, not as a static,
but as a dynamic substance continually interacting with social forces
outside itself, influencing the latter as much as being influenced by them.
He accordingly sets out to describe the functional relationship of law to
living patterns of institutional and human behavior, addressing himself to
questions such as the following: What has been law's role in shaping extralegal processes in our society? What are the forces and ideas that have
given to law its distinctive quality? What has law generally meant to
Americans and what have been its contributions to the formation of their
social values and political culture? What have been and what are law's
limitations and potentialities in structuring social process and organization
in the United States? This refreshing tack in legal scholarship helps to
answer the plea of another scholar who recently said that the time has
arrived "to reinclude within scholarly concern a conception of law as an
embodiment of civilization and not merely a vocational adjunct of civilized
society."4
This study proceeds from no highly refined hypotheses tested and
qualified by rigid methods of investigation and verification of the social
scientist. This is principally an interpretative essay and whatever it may
1. Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
2. HuRsT, THE GRowTH or AmucRAN LAw: THE LAwmAKERS (1950).
3. HuasT, LAw AD m CONDITIONS OF FnFO
xn
iN mx NiETEENr-CENTUrMY
UNrrED STATES (1956).

4. Falk, The Relations of Law to Culture, Power, and Justice, LXXII Ermcs 12
(October, 1961).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 15

lack in methodological perfection is more than offset by the power of the
author's analysis and his careful selection of detail to illustrate broad themes
and general trends. Professor Hurst deliberately avoids what he considers
to be the pitfalls of excessive fact-gathering which confuses data collection
with understanding, and technique with knowledge, for "the learned
writing which lasts, which has significance, is writing which represents its
times, but manages also to step outside them."5 Legal history becomes
significant when our ability to gather evidence is disciplined by a keen
theoretical perspective. "Our first problem as a legal scholar," says Professor
Hurst, "is to serve the legal order, which needs to know more about itself,"6
and that implies a greater knowledge of law at an operational level.
The author views broadly both law and legal history. Assuming law's
paramount role in defining social context, Professor Hurst says:
For all its frailties and fictions, law operated with force not matched by any
other major institution of social order to press men to define ends and means.
Hence its product of constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions-and, later, administrative rules and orders-yielded the largest single body of articulated values and
value-oriented contrivances in society. At once more diffuse and particularized and
partisan, and yet likewise presenting exceptional definitions of values and attitudes,
was the vast body of more fugitive documents produced in administering legal
order; lawyers' briefs, contracts, deeds of trust, articles of private association,
documents evidencing personal status, such as adoption papers or naturalization
certificates, and offcial forms reflecting the manifold aspects of life involved in tax
returns, licenses, and license applications, or the census. Nowhere else did men
undertake so much to explain themselves.7

Accordingly "legal history of full dimension should deal with the growth
of ideas and attributes that pertain to men's social relations." 8 Law, looked
at from this point of view, is pre-eminently social science, and underlying
this approach to legal history is an implicit plea for greater interdisciplinary
effort in uncovering law's explicit relation to extralegal phenomena.
With his broad perspective Professor Hurst departs from the typical linear
approach to legal history which traces the doctrinal development of a
specialized category of law and from the narrow analytical approach which
views law as a self-contained system of rules. Here one receives a crosssectional view of society at various points in time in order to ascertain the
reciprocal influences of law and social process. To illustrate law's interplay
with social process the author purposely selects his examples, not from the
stimulating drama of American legal experience, but from the daily run-ofthe mill stuff that one invariably finds when perusing the records of state
court reports or thumbing through state or federal session laws. Illustrative
5.
6.
7.
8.

Hurst, Perspectives Upon Research Into the Legal Order, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 357.
Id. at 366.
HuRsT, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN TJNTED STATES HISTORY 12-13 (1960).
Id. at 13.
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of these recurrent instances are the abandonment of the tidewater concept
of federal admiralty jurisdiction, the development of the law relating to
industrial accident, an action to collect a money award on account of
damage to an automobile under a statute requiring towns to keep their
roads in sound repair, an 1860 Wisconsin action demanding specific
performance on a contract to convey title to land owned by the United
States, and the shaping of public policy towards the production and
marketing of milk.
Professor Hurst begins by inquiring what law has meant in the experience
of the American people and he concludes that law's distinctive role in the
United States is marked by four features. First, law possesses a legitimate
monopoly of force and violence in the community, implying the capacity of
government to call to account all forms of non-official power. Second, law
is equated with constitutionalism suggesting limitation upon the exercise of
power; law in the United States has been used to achieve and secure values
higher than itself. Thus we treat law as a means rather than as an end.
Third, law has meant formal procedure; that is, the process of individual as
well as collective goal seeking in this society is circumscribed, canalized,
and ultimately legitimated by submission to the rigor of procedural due
process. Finally, law has traditionally been used "as a major means for
allocating human and other than human resources among competing life
satisfactions."9 Here the author stresses an aspect of law's role in American
history in need of greater elaboration than it has received. Law's positive
contribution to social process in the 19th century, for example, seems to have
been grossly underestimated because of undue emphasis upon constitutional
restraint and the market allocation of resources in historical writing. Law
in actual fact played a very significant role in structuring social process and
in promoting economic development throughout the 19th century; 10 the
market-law relationship was one of intrinsic tension and reciprocity, the
interplay between the two expressing a "good deal of our way of life,
reaching into values and attitudes that concern much more than merely
doing business.""
The four principal essays in the book are organized around broad concepts facilely employed to explain the functional relationship of law to
social process. The first essay ("Drift and Direction") is concerned with the
non-legal influences and pressures which shaped law's distinctive character
in this society. The remaining essays ("Initiative and Response," "Leverage'
and Support," and "Force and Fruition") attempt to explain law's influence
upon events.
While Professor Hurst indicates that law has been used to direct events,
9. id..at 4.
10. See Auerbach, Law and Social Change in the United States, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
519-23 (1959).
11. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 5 (1960).
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he believes that much of our legal growth has been determined by "the
cumulative drift of circumstance or in response only to the most immediately perceived functional demands of social institutions." 2 In this society
legal growth was conditioned by the unprecedented availability of land,
an independent and robust population, the development of technical competence, the range of opportunity, and the magnitude of our objectives,
conditions generative of boiling optimism, swirling activity, dynamic growth,
and ambitious goals. From the matrix of this maelstrom evolved a law
alert to the possibilities of the hour, but heedless of the needs of the future.
Law responded to immediacy and to instant demand (drift) by sanctioning
private endeavor and by maximizing personal satisfactions; thus law was
used to ratify agreements between private decision-makers (property and
contract law), to legitimize market operations (assignment of public functions to private groups and the use of the corporate franchise), and to
create an atmosphere conducive to the release of individual initiative. The
public interest seems to have had no specific identity apart from the cumulation of private goal-seeking.
Yet law was subject to contrary pressures. As the frontier began to
close and as men perfected their fact-finding capabilities, legislatures
started to seize the initiative from the judiciary by focusing upon goals
broader than immediate fulfillment of private desire. Law's response to
tensions growing out of the development of science and technology was
hardheaded assessment of the social and human costs involved in unimpeded private endeavor. These polar tendencies in our historical experience (drift versus direction and private wants versus public needs),
Professor Hurst suggests, constitute a major theme in our law which should
be studied more closely.
Law's relation to the American drive for personal self-realization is also
a variant of the same theme. Culturally, Professor Hurst notes, we were
irrevocably committed to pragmatism which measured value by the success of practical operations. We combined respect for the dignity of man
with belief in the individuals capacity to govern his own destiny. Governing one's own destiny, however, implied incessant activity capped by
accomplishment yielding a personal sense of meaningful direction. Law
sanctioned these efforts and contributed to the growth of this society by
helping to generate purposeful initiative in human affairs. This, the author
believes, is law's most noble function. Specifically, law was used to serve
human creativity by sharpening men's perceptions of cause and effect,
by expanding their range of choices, and by enlarging their goals. Law
fostered directed effort by its emphasis upon procedural regularities and
by stimulating "creative tension between form and substance and between
12. Id. at 28.
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generals and particulars." 13 From the ensuing dialectic there emerges
thrust giving direction to affairs. In effect, Professor Hurst argues that by
funneling substance (policy-making) through law's forms (procedures by
which courts, legislatures, and other official bodies reach decisions) we
refine issues, sharpen our perceptive powers, and discipline our feelings.
Law, as processor, accordingly refines the product (policy-decision) in
casting off superfluities which becloud vision and by augmenting individual and collective awareness of where we are and where we are going.
Similarly law fosters tension between generals and particulars. Generalizations (customs, institutions, and the standards within and by which
Americans live and work and forge public policy) are continuously challenged by the particularity of daily experience resulting eventually in the
destruction, qualification, or refinement of the former. Political scientist
David Easton notes that "changing social environment, operating on the
plastic nature of man, is constantly creating people who respond differently to similar situations." 14 Professor Hurst adds that as men grow in
knowledge and competence they refine their perceptions of generals by
translating them into legal forms (statutes, administrative decisions, etc.)
which define their values and their goals. He states: 'Effective generalization reduces confusing, apparently unrelated variety to statements of relative simplicity, yielding perception of relations that can be manipulated.
... [T]ranslation of this insight into action typically involves orderly recreation of variety, defining limited objectives and contributing specific
means to realize the new knowledge in the context of varying circumstance." 5 The author illustrates this process by tracing the development
of the regulation of the milk industry in the United States. He notes that
the legal control of the production, marketing, and handling of milk proceeded from very broad to specific definition as our knowledge of the
uses and abuses of this basic life substance increased until we achieved
"regulation adequately adapted to the circumstances of the product."16
The milk legislation also illustrates the "leverage" and "support" functions of law in the United States. Professor Hurst notes that law originally
penalized the illegal sale of unwholesome foods and, as a result, "lent law's
help [support] to maintaining the biological requisites of life and the
service requisites of an acceptable market."' 7 Laws support role was
also reflected in licensing legislation preservative of broad standards governing milk production and in the allocation of public funds to build and
sustain all-weather road systems, thus indirectly assisting and stimulating
the growth of the dairy industry.
13. Id. at 131.
14.
15.
16.
17.

EAsToN, THE PoLrrxcAL SysTm 32 (1953).
HuRsT, LAw AND SociAL PRoCEss iN UNITED STATES HISTORY 134 (1960).
Id. at 96.
Id. at 182.
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On the other hand, law created leverage in stimulating the release of
creative initiative when it authorized the formation of city and state health
authorities and state agricultural departments, just as when it sanctioned,
and aided, the work of state agricultural extension centers, agricultural
societies, and dairymen's associations. Law, indeed, makes its greatest
contribution to civilization when it formulates purpose and creates new
centers of initiative arising out of greater human awareness of cause
and effect and results in greater rationalization of the life of society.
Where law's leverage function failed, as in public lands disposition and
in the allocation of forest and timberland resources, law's role was accompanied by a corruption of the purity of America's major philosophic strain
which Professor Hurst dubs "bastard pragmatism." Here Americans tended
to confuse private fulfillment with broad public interest, quantity with
quality, and narrow opportunity with intelligence.
Professor Hurst concludes with a consideration of law's use of force in
the United States. Though affirming as one of its chief characteristics the
legitimate monopoly of violence, law's actual force has been of marginal
significance in this society, suggesting commitment to the twin values of
individualism and constitutionalism. At very few points in United States
history has the law's force been applied directly to counter violence not
sanctioned by law. In fact, the frequent employment of law's force to
domestic affairs would involve excessive conflict repressive of creative
endeavor and indicative of a lack of basic consensus about the purpose
and nature of government.
It is more accurate, says Professor Hurst, to speak of "reserved violence"
or the "potential force of law" in assessing this aspect of law's contribution to social process. Law's "reserved violence" kept private decisionmaking centers in line; the ultimate threat of law's force merely helped to
strengthen habits imposed by the procedural emphasis in our law. Correlatively, the "potential force of law" insured the neutrality, integrity, and
independence of the political process itself, within which all legitimate
private power centers were permitted to contest for the perquisites of
power. This implied law's acceptance of pluralism as a political way of
life; law demanded that all groups at least be able to participate and
compete in policy formation.
But the protection of the political process also demanded self-control on
the part of government lest it arrogate to itself functions that do not properly belong to it. Thus law subjects military authority to civilian control
and provides other devices for bringing civil authority to account. Moreover, man is not exclusively a political animal. Law merely underwrites
men's partial commitment to political society so that ample room is left to
allow man to develop his capacities, originate new centers of activity, and
seek meaning in other phases (economic, social, religious, etc.) of his life.
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There is little in this volume to which the reviewer takes serious exception. Professor Hurst argues his case persuasively and, I think, captures
the meaning of American legal experience as few of his contemporaries
have done. Indeed, he has an uncanny facility for making important sense
out of the most commonplace legal materials and fitting their meaning
into the broad framework of our legal, intellectual, and social traditions.
My congeniality toward this book, however, is not without some reservation. Professor Hurst is presenting what he thinks are the distinctive characteristies of law in the United States. I wonder whether a similar study
of law in England, let us say, would disclose the same traits and ambiguities, for I suspect a basic consanguinity between the roles which law has
played in the two societies.
A basic assumption of the book is that American law is a product of its
environment. One cannot, of course, gainsay that experience has contributed to the structure of our law, but Professor Hurst's heavy stress on
the influence of physical setting in the shaping of American law and character at times seems to come uncomfortably close to an environmental
determinism reminiscent of Frederick J. Turner's frontier thesis. 18 Could
one, for instance, argue with equal effect that the characteristics of our
law are a result of cultural inheritance and habits of mind developed
anterior to physical contact with reality in America? The comment would
at least seem to suggest the virtue of comparative study in this area.
Professor Hurst has an abiding interest in Wisconsin legal history. But
I wonder whether Wisconsin, from whose legal experience many of his
illustrations are taken, can be considered a microcosm of the United States.
It occurs to me that law's characteristics as well as its relation to social process might yield differing interpretations depending upon whether one is concerned with law's historical role in the settled communities of the eastern
seaboard states, or in Louisiana where French influences have been predominant, or in California with its Spanish heritage, or on the Wisconsin
frontier where law was fashioned from the confluence of common law with
the common sense of the pioneer.
These questions, however, do not detract from the tremendous appeal
of this book. Reading it is a rewarding intellectual exercise. And if
Professor Hurst's conclusions are not accepted by all who read this
volume, no, one will deny that he has furnished stimulating propositions
susceptible to further inquiry, or that he has raised terribly important
questions relative to the interplay between law and society, or that he
has underscored the desirability, if not the necessity, for a reorientation in
legal research generally.
DONALD

18. TURNEn, THE FRONTIER

n AMMCAN HISTORY 1-38 (1920).
* Assistant Professor of Government, Los Angeles State College.

P. KoMmERs*
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TAE COMMON Lxw TRADMON: DECIDiNG APPxELs. By Karl Llewellyn.
New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1960. Pp. xii, 565. $8.50.
Only in the 20th century and in the United States could such a subject
be treated in such a manner and for such a purpose. This century ushered
in the winds and light of psychoanalysis; Freud struck a vibrant cord with
his revelations and its reverberations have now reached to the administration of justice. "What is new in juristic thought today," said Justice Cardozo "is chiefly the candour of its processes; . ..from time immemorial

lawyers have felt the impulse to pare down the old rules when in conflict
with present needs." Unawares, our predecessors disguised from themselves their role in the realities of developing law in fresh adaptations,
protesting an inherency of the new in the old, a pre-existence, awaiting
emergence, in the process of which they played only a declaratory part.
Modification is not then a new phenomenon; but Professor Llewellyn in
consummate candour has engaged the task of an investigation of factors
operating subjectively and objectively in the adjudicative process of
appellate court judges in the United States; and he displays for unfeigned
admiration an analysis pursued to that ultimate detail which today characterizes the extreme elaboration of most of America's organizational activities from football to the Pentagon. We are presented, among a profusion
of other specifics, with 15 major steadying factors in such adjudications,
and 64 tissued differentiations of techniques available in the treatment of
precedent. In addition to the more or less visible influences on judges and
court action, other factors, obvious though invisible, concealed within the
workings of the law, debouch in relatively clean contours as of mental
precipitation; their manipulation in balanced re-shaping, strengthening,
restriction and expansion, proceeds within indicated 'lee-ways." Still others
elude precipitation or analysis; faintly luminous and thinly diffused, as indicated by their names, instinct, shrewdness, horse-sense, sense of justice,
hunch, and others, they cannot be possessed by mere willing; felt rather
than glimpsed as extra-rational, they trail intellect like shadows. But as
does conscience, they hover and intrude and resist expulsion. They go ultimately to the ethic or "wisdom" of life as a datum, and not even the
analytical power of the author can sort their elements out.
He has been stirred to this work by what he takes to be a crisis in widespread critical disparagement of appellate decisions, directed against the
treatment of problems daily presented to those courts. Legal education
generally is seen as deficient and the production of competent lawyers to
suffer accordingly. The case is for "reckonability" of judgments: that they
be more predictable. In the end, Professor Llewellyn finds no warrant for
the general dissatisfaction and that appellate courts are giving a good
account of themselves. Nevertheless there is room for improvement and
it is the object of the treatise to arouse the Bar, Bench and Schools to a
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fresh appreciation of the functions involved and, among other things, of
understanding the art and technique of law's movement. In offering many
suggestions of substantive treatment of this, and notwithstanding disclaimer, he achieves a legitimate association with Sir George Jessel, a
judge of unusual stature, who, while acknowledging that he might at times
have been wrong, never had any doubt of his rightness.
This prescription of technique to sustain the tradition of law in viability
is addressed mainly to the "felt" necessity of that greater "reckonability";
and while past stereotyped locutions or formulas in opinions may have
answered sufficiently the questions of "historians of culture or government,"
they afford persons with pending litigation comfort as "chilly as advice
of general trends" offered to a business man contemplating a particular
venture. The desideratum is a fair regularity of outcome through the
artistic resolution of factors furnishing modes of reaching decision; of
that apparatus he supplies the specifications.
The initial and primary stages of function are situation-sense, typesituation, situation-problem. With the counters applied to these and supplemental elements reached through mastery of the factual areas, there
will be conjured up that "singing reason" which in the words of Levin
Goldsmidt reveals the situation's "Immanent Law." No reflection is intended by the use of quotation marks: the emphasis placed on "situation"
is, if I may say so, a thoroughly sound emphasis. Together the formulas
are designed to advance a front of living law, evolving in steadiness and
balance with the parallel modifications in features of social life within the
law's scope, exhibiting continuity and change in predictable uniformity
and reasonable certainty.
This portrait of the body of law in slow movement through time by
adaptation and modification of rules, precepts and principles, consistent
and harmonious, absorbing and giving effect to new factors in organic
growth, is strikingly presented in a unique vocabulary; and the complex
of ideas offered to shape that advance is no less so. Apart from statutory
interpretation, the germinating principle of this advance, the dynamic of
precedent, holds primacy of attention. By the prescriptions laid down, its
workings are to be freed of much of present stultifying features. With
doctrine so cleansed the courts can bring about reshaping and re-direction
while preserving identity in new growth and harmonizing law with life.
As the author drives his ideas through many pages, situation-sense,
situation-type and situation-problem create their own problems: how is
that view of situation reached which reveals the "Immanent Law"? What
are the signs of recognition? In rational objective factors, there is the
weight felt to be attributed to or felt to inhere in them severally or in
linkage, from which a view or conception arises as dominant; but this
attribution and its weight or value depend in turn upon "judgment" for
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which there is no scientific measurement. That may follow experiences of
like factors; but in too many cases subtle forces already mentioned, sense
of justice, instinctive tendency, even the deepest analysis gives up as both
impenetrable in themselves and ineradicable from adjudication.
The interesting feature of the utility of these conscious and self-conscious
means is the character of their functioning: to act as censors of the mind
which is to respect them. Conceptualized in an awareness of their operating influence, they would constitute in their highest manifestation a code
of precepts the effect of which, on the adjudicating process itself, is appreciated in the course of the process: the mind in awareness of the mode of its
own activities is placed under the observation of admonitory and other
prescriptions become quasi-immanent in the process. Can the intellect
consciously implant factors of aid or admonition so as to co-act with
the processes of judgment as alert sentinels, presiding presences of influence, evidencing in awareness conflict with the processes, a communication
of the nature of a sense of resemblance, dissimilarity or analogy?
That seems to be a matter of degree. Something analogous may be
possible after a drastic discipline in simple or uncomplicated intellectual
action. A sensitivity, for example, toward language can become reactive
from any, even the slightest, departure by self or others from standards of
expression; so habituated it will take on, unawares of the conscious mind,
a settled unobtrusive vigil for verbal dereliction. But to propose such a
censor for complex reasoning, as observer in quasi-immanence, a subconscious observer reporting conflict with admonition, seems to be beyond
the mind's power. Fallacious reasoning may reveal itself in conclusions
reached but that is different; a subsequent catechizing of one's self on the
observance of rule by rule throughout the whole gamut may be conceived,
but assuming it possible, that again is not the same. And on this, we have
Professor Llewellyn:
That problem goes to whether a craft like appellate judging can without destruction of its fineness, its sureness, its soul be subjected by its practitioners to selfconscious intellectual analysis. In another aspect, the problem goes to whether
articulate principles or rules for doing, phrasings for the inculcation or transmission of knowhow, will not cripple or kill, rather than further and better the
doing of the job. There is the old tale of the centipede who, once set to ponder
how he managed the coordination of his regiment of legs, discovered in panic
that he no longer could. There is the feeling, half-mystic, close akin to those only
partly intellectual ideas of the "true" rule and of "finding" the law, that the working processes of a right-minded court have in them something of the ineffable,
that they can grasp by a sort of inspiration a result beyond the powers of the
members; the feeling that there is some Delphic or Sibylline attribute somehow
or at least sometimes at work; and such feelings have more basis than is readily
granted by the wiseacre who has once or twice seen judges in a wrangle or
"knows" the scuttlebutt about some compromise.

Self-consciousness can be an enemy of art and is repelled in the career
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of intellectual intensity; but it is a civilizing agent in ridding the mind and
personality of excrescences which deface both. As a reflective censor it
can free thought from many traps and entanglements; but even at the cost
of some degree of unevenness, we cannot afford interruptive frustration
by it of free concentrated "objective" thinking.
That is not to say that this brilliant exposition, seriously grappled with
by one capable of self-examination, will not afford benefit. Most appellate
judges can surely be expected to have reached some degree of capacity to
sense their own predilections or biases, in whom at least the factors of gross
influence have been nullified; and with, deeper probing the clarification of
other ideas from shadowy form into clearer outline will follow. That the
normal course of reaching judgment except perhaps in special cases will be
materially affected by all this incantation is doubtful; justice is rough and
will remain so. Most of the subtle items brought into relief are already
more or less wrapped up in shrewdness, "horse-sense," and similiar attributions. How many of Professor Llewellyn's "giants," Holt, Mansfield, Blackburn, Hamilton, Kennedy, Cowen, Hough, Hand-all, it will be noticed,
outstanding in Professor Llewellyn's field, Commercial Law-have deeply
concerned themselves with such excursions into the subjective as are
suggested? What they have exhibited in their work has been a mastery of
external situation, absorbing its spirit and internal principle through
imaginative grasp and probing of the interplay of interests to the lowest
levels of purpose and motivation, penetrating situation to its foundations.
Analysis reaching into such minutiae as is proposed would-I risk sayingmake these giants (with the probable exception of the last), like Quintilian,
"stare and gasp." Their faculty of empathy is not to be equated much less
identified with awareness of classified atoms or the anatomy of their own
subjective states.
Is not mind of known disciplined habit, dominating most of the factors
irrelevant to judgment, though grounded in deep assumptions, precisely
what is intended to be placed in the seats of justice? The discipline of
office produces adjustment of perspective to factors lying behind situation.
Chiefly when assumptions, whether apprehended or not, are taken as
absolutes, do difficulties arise. If it were given us to be able to detect in
rational grasp every psychic factor or influence, whatever its source, underlying judgment, the adjudications of the common law from the earliest years
and their adaptations would probably have led to much less of the
imperfection at which this critique is mainly directed. With the modifications, substitutions or additions of factors equally well apprehended and
calling for new formulations, experience would give greater range and
soundness to determination. But even with all this, dominance of factors
in reaching conclusions would still in general be affected by an elusive
potency. As in the quest of the scientist Cure, a presence unaccounted
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for would remain. Situation-sense (so properly stressed)-what is the secret
of its selection? Objectively it is the product of the given mind in
experience and the choice which it makes, when wise, would seem to be
that view which will ultimately be accorded general acceptance, an effect
authentically anticipated through a calculation, in part, of an un-apprehended factors. Is this the expression of hidden, stored-up experience? Is
the categorical imperative immanent in the mind's ethical intelligence?
Nevertheless the treatment of precedent by Professor Llewellyn in bringing into focus such techniques as ignoring them, making spurious
distinctions, attributing foreign grounds, crude blurring over and the like,
as well as stirring us all to an awareness of what is set out generally, is a
most valuable act of candour. Few are the precedents which by closer
examination of the facts and deeper probing of the reasoning, do not yield
a clearer enunciation of their essential idea. When that remains without
effect, honesty demands straightforward dealing. Yet the fiction of predetermination, of pre-existence, was, in its time and place, (and to a faint
recollection, as Dean Pound once expressed himself) not without benefit
and justification. It is easier, of course, to formulate a mode of giving
growth to rule and precept than to follow its instruction. (Vide Portia.) At
times there is somewhat of academic self-assurance in pronouncements of
"rightness" or "wrongness" on court decision; but even were the courts
accessible to-in many respects-our torch-bearers, I see no guarantee that
their work would usher us into a legal utopia. Byron once wrote that
"Critics all are ready-made"; at least we can say that in some cases that
seems to be the case. Courts, listening to competent counsel representing
realities of interest charged with more or less emotion, catch the feel of
"justice"-a fact fully appreciated by Professor Llewellyn; and though, under
microscopic examination, the reasoning at times may appear inadequate,
the conclusions ordinarily are not. That "feel" is of psychic elusiveness and
instinctive objective recognition characterizes the great law givers.
The author at one point remarks on the "ecstasy" with which, after all
appropriate techniques have been accomplished, a direct supporting precedent is found. Apart from the extravagance, the particular idea behind
this emotion is not too clear. The satisfaction of reaching judgment after a
mastery of situation-even as the author's over the matters exposed hereis sufficient for ending one essay and passing to the next.
It is not irrelevant to interpose here the dictum of Lord Dunedin that
.mere citation of authority is inimical to clear decision." Under the
pressures of modem court dockets, with the multiplication of authorities
from scores of jurisdictions, with only 24 hours a day and even with a life
span average of eighty years,-and an ordinary impluse to stretch one's
limbs-thinking rather than excessive reading becomes increasingly necessary; and the Grand Style of opinion writing, the stately march from general
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conception to particular situation-and as urged, adumbration for future
guidance-has had much of its best expression when authorities were fewer.
The function of precedent or near precedent is certainly not wholly to
furnish complusion or guidance; it serves also to reveal new factual aspects
of situations ordinarily beyond the range of realistic imagination.
The volume proliferates topics of interest from the coercion of office to
the influence of law clerks; these with their detailed classifications and
their elaborations, appropriately-to an American expositor-enumerated,
and infused with a well-tinctured gaiety, invite consideration which neither
space nor time permits. To say that the work is a striking product of deep,
intensive and comprehensive thinking, and masterly grasp, regardless of
what may be looked upon by some as deformations in style and wordageboth of which tend to a chronic irruption on the flow of understanding-is
simple fact and the least of its deserts.
I. C. RAND*
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